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By: Scott A. Coffina
On Jan. 30, 2026, the appellate division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of the 13-count indictment against New Jersey power broker George Norcross, and five other defendants, including: Norcross’ brother Philip Norcross, the managing partner of Parker McCay law firm; William Tambussi, who frequently served as counsel to George Norcross; Dana Redd, former Mayor of Camden; Sidney Brown, the CEO of NFI, a trucking and logistics company; and John O’Donnell, an executive in The Michaels Organization, a residential developer.
The indictment, brought in June 2024, was the culmination of a seven-year on-and-off-and-on-again investigation that had the hallmarks of the state having a defendant (George Norcross) in search of a crime, which is never a promising prospect for the prosecution. (Full disclosure, the author represented several witnesses in the investigation, none of whom were charged in the case). In February 2025, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the 111-page “speaking indictment,” and the state appealed. Aside from the political intrigue surrounding this case, there are several important legal issues, including a couple of first impressions in New Jersey, addressed in the opinion.
The essence of the trial court’s dismissal, and the appellate court’s decision is that the lengthy speaking indictment failed to assert the offenses of theft by extortion or criminal coercion which underpinned all the other offenses (mainly conspiracy charges), that Dana Redd did not commit any act of official misconduct, and all charges but one were facially time-barred. The appellate division opinion is noteworthy in the following respects:
1. The court confirmed that a speaking indictment is subject to the same facial review as non-speaking indictments.
As noted, the state presented a speaking indictment setting forth its theory of the case at great length. The state argued that the trial court had erred by applying a new standard to its review of the indictment, utilizing a “sufficiency-of-the-evidence-included-in-the-indictment” test without reviewing the grand jury record. The state maintained that the court should have considered the “reams of testimony and exhibits” the grand jury reviewed and concluded that the indictment was supported by sufficient evidence to survive the motion to dismiss instead of conducting a mere facial review as done with the more common “barebones” indictments.
The appellate division affirmed that a speaking indictment is subject to the same facial review as non-speaking indictments, and that for purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must assume the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment. Indeed, the court noted that the defendants recognized that as well, to the degree of assuming that “allegations were adequately supported before the grand jury.” Nevertheless, the defendants had argued that the facts alleged in the state’s speaking indictment “did not constitute a crime … as a matter of law.”
The appellate court noted that the presumption of truth in an indictment’s allegations does not require it to afford the state the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, finding no authority requiring or even authorizing the court to adopt “such an indulgent standard.” The court found no error with the trial court conducting a facial review of the indictment and stated that “a facial review does not … permit a court to assess the evidentiary strength of the state’s case. “Upholding the trial court’s facial review, it added, “If the theories of culpability embodied in the indictment do not constitute a crime on their face, the court should dismiss the indictment.”
Based on its de novo review, the appellate court concluded the charged offenses either were time-barred or failed to state an offense. It affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the
indictment entirely.
2. As a matter of first impression, the appellate division concluded that the receipt of ongoing, otherwise lawful payments (in this case, tax credits) does not toll the applicable statute of limitations.
The trial court found that the indictment’s alleged RICO conspiracy and conspiracies to commit extortion to obtain property for redevelopment in Camden were barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations, because the critical events occurred prior to June 2019 (which was five years before the date of the indictment). The state had argued that the trial court erred because the defendants later received tax credits enabled by the redevelopment of the property they allegedly obtained through extortion, and those tax credits extended the life of the conspiracy.
The appellate division noted that the question of whether ongoing payments extended the time of a conspiracy was an issue of first impression in New Jersey state courts. The trial court had relied upon federal decisions in other circuits in concluding “a conspiracy for economic gain does not continue until the accomplishment of the conspiracy’s economic objectives if those economic objectives are achieved through the receipt of serial payments that are ‘lengthy, indefinite, ordinary… noncriminal and unilateral,’” citing United States v. Grimm , 738 F.3d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 2013) and United States v. Doherty , 867 F.2d 47, 61 (1st Cir. 1989). The trial court concluded that the indictment had not alleged that the tax credits were obtained unlawfully and therefore did not extend the time of the conspiracy.
The parties argued the respective positions of Grimm and Doherty , with the state arguing that there development tax credits were a “central objective” of the conspiracy, thus extending it, while the defendants argued that to hold that the long-term recurring award of tax credits extended the life of the alleged conspiracy would make every financial crime a perpetual offense and defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations. The appellate division determined that the
Grimm and Doherty “doctrine”—making a distinction between the future receipt of economic benefits on an ongoing conspiracy, and ongoing economic benefits that are the result of a completed conspiracy—applied to the present case. It agreed with the trial court that the indictment had not alleged that the recurring tax credits were independently illegal, and rather were the “result” of the alleged conspiracy that concluded with the completion of the respective redevelopment deals.
Accordingly, the five-year statute of limitations barred all but one of the RICO and general conspiracies and underlying crimes alleged in the indictment. Regarding the one alleged conspiracy that was timely asserted—to acquire by extortion the property and development rights of the Radio Lofts building in Camden—the court concluded that the indictment failed to satisfy the elements of conspiracy to extort or coerce Radio Lofts’ developer to relinquish his rights, alleging neither an agreement among the defendants, nor threats relied on by the developer.
3. The appellate division found that the charge against former Camden Mayor Dana Redd for official misconduct was clearly time-barred.
The indictment charged former Camden Mayor Dana Redd with official misconduct, alleging that the Norcross Enterprise had rewarded her for taking actions to facilitate the alleged conspiracy, by placing her in the position of CEO of the Rowan University/Rutgers Camden Board of Governors after she left office on Jan. 1, 2018. The trial court had found, however, that no alleged actions were taken by Redd after June 2017, when the seven-year statute of limitations began to run. The court rejected that the state’s theory that giving Redd a job in 2018 was a quid pro quo for her participation in the alleged conspiracy through actions taken between 2013 and 2016, finding it to be “conclusory supposition” and “clearly time-barred” as the only alleged acts by Redd after June2017 were her concluding her term and getting a job. More substantively, the trial court determined that Redd had not exercised the powers of her office beyond their authorization or withheld action she was compelled to take, in violation of the official misconduct statute.
On appeal, the state argued that the trial court had imposed too high a standard for an official misconduct charge, citing four specific official acts the mayor purportedly performed to advance the goals of the conspiracy.
Deciding another issue New Jersey courts had not addressed before, the appellate division concluded that Redd’s hiring by Rowan/Rutgers in 2018 did not extend the seven-year statute of limitations for official misconduct. The court noted that the charge itself failed to allege that Reddacted with the purpose to obtain the Rowan/Rutgers position, but rather the “thrust” of the indictment was that she acted to obtain redevelopment benefits for the alleged Enterprise. The Rowan/Rutgers position did not even come up until December 2017, well after the redevelopment deals were completed and the last act alleged by Redd, in 2016. The court thus held that “the State cannot rely on the mere receipt of a benefit, which is not an element of the offense, to extend the life of an official misconduct charge indefinitely.”
4. The appellate division decision did not address the question of charging counsel for the routine practice of law.
Having disposed of the indictment on the grounds discussed above, the court stated that it “need not consider” the arguments raised by Philip Norcross, William Tambussi, and several amici about the state charging lawyers for “the routine practice of law.” The allegations against Philip Norcross, and especially, William Tambussi, described conduct engaged in every day by lawyers representing their clients (i.e., research, advice, and motion practice), and the indictment, if left
standing, would have blurred the line between legitimate zealous advocacy and illegal activity. No lawyer wants to jeopardize their license—not to mention their freedom—based upon unclear standards governing the routine practice of law. As a result, Tambussi and Norcross drew support from such organizations as the New Jersey State Bar Association and American College of Trial Lawyers, arguing against the criminalization of the routine practice of law. (The state, for its part, argued that it was not criminalizing the routine practice of law, but rather charging attorneys for “engaging in criminal conspiracies and conspiring to use the tools of government to achieve illicit ends.”)
With the appellate division declining to address this issue, the bar is left to hope prosecutors will exercise prudence and appropriate restraint in future actions where charges against lawyers are considered.
Looking Ahead
It remains to be seen whether this is the closing chapter on the Norcross case. New Jersey’s new attorney general, Jennifer Davenport, has the opportunity to take a fresh look at the case and the two adverse rulings by the trial court and appellate division, and decide whether to petition for further review by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Because the appellate division addressed at least two novel questions of law in its opinion, the state may be inclined to petition for certification. On the other hand, given the political turmoil and blowback this case has engendered for the AG’s office, the new attorney general might decide it is time to move on from this matter and focus the office’s attention elsewhere.
Scott A. Coffina is the former Burlington County Prosecutor, and a former Assistant United States Attorney. He currently is a partner and co-chair of the government enforcement, compliance and white collar litigation practice at Pietragallo, Gordon Alfano Bosick & Raspanti, LLP, and manages the firm’s office in Marlton.
Reprinted with permission from the February 9th issue of the New Jersey Law Journal. © 2026 ALM Media Properties, LLC. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. All rights reserved.