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By: Gaetan J. Alfano , Jesse Marra
Attorneys and law firms should think carefully before responding to a former client’s negative online review with a defamation lawsuit.
A July 21 decision from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania illustrates why an unsuccessful suit may do more than amplify the criticism — it may also leave the law firm responsible for the former client’s legal fees.
In Lento Law Group PC v. Estrada, U.S. District Judge Mia Roberts Perez dismissed a law firm’s defamation claims arising from a former client’s online criticism.[1] More importantly, the court held that Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Uniform Public Expression Protection Act — commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP law — required the firms to pay their former client’s attorney fees, court costs and litigation expenses.
The decision is significant not merely because it applies Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute to a dispute between a law firm and former client, but because it addresses an unsettled question concerning the statute’s operation in federal court. The court held that a defendant who successfully obtains dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may invoke the statute’s immunity and mandatory fee-shifting provisions, even though the statute’s separate special motion procedure is not currently operative in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania’s Anti-SLAPP Framework
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act took effect on July 17, 2024. The statute is designed to address so-called strategic lawsuits against public participation, or SLAPP, suits — claims used to burden or chill protected speech and other forms of public expression.
Under the act, a “person is immune from civil liability for a cause of action based on protected public expression if” the plaintiff: (1) fails to “state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted,” (2) fails to “establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action,” or (3) cannot overcome a showing that “[t]here is no genuine issue [of] material fact” and that the defendant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The financial consequence of that immunity is significant. Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP law provides that, when immunity applies, “the court shall award the [defendant] attorney fees, court costs and expenses of litigation” against the adverse party who asserted the claim.[2]
The act also contemplates a separate special motion procedure designed to facilitate early dismissal of claims arising from protected expression. But that provision is not presently effective because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not promulgated implementing procedural rules.
That procedural wrinkle has generated an important question for litigants in federal court: If the special motion mechanism is unavailable, can a defendant who obtains dismissal under the ordinary federal rules still invoke the act’s immunity and mandatory fee-shifting provisions?
In Lento, Judge Perez answered yes.
The Underlying Dispute
Kris Emmanuel Estrada retained Lento Law Group PC and Lento Law Firm to represent him in a university disciplinary matter and a criminal case in Washington, D.C. After becoming dissatisfied with the firms’ representation, Estrada posted more than a dozen online reviews accusing the firms of missing court appearances, failing to provide clear or regular updates, producing inadequate results, charging improper fees, and acting unprofessionally.
The Lento firms sued Estrada for defamation, commercial disparagement and related claims.
The court dismissed the action. As for defamation, Judge Perez concluded that many of the challenged statements were nonactionable opinions based on disclosed facts. Estrada did not merely characterize the firms negatively; he identified the experiences that led him to those conclusions. That distinction mattered because, under Pennsylvania defamation law, opinions based on disclosed facts ordinarily are not actionable where readers can evaluate the underlying facts and decide for themselves whether the speaker’s conclusion is justified.
The commercial disparagement claim fared no better. The court held that generalized allegations of lost clients, business opportunities and negative search engine consequences did not adequately plead the specific pecuniary loss required for a commercial disparagement claim.
Those rulings disposed of the substantive tort claims. But the most consequential portion of the opinion came next.
When a Rule 12 Dismissal Triggers Mandatory Fee Shifting
Estrada did not seek dismissal through the act’s special motion procedure. He moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and the court applied the ordinary federal pleading standard.
The parties did not dispute that Estrada’s online reviews concerning the professionalism and ethics of lawyers addressed matters of public concern, and therefore constituted protected public expression. Once the court concluded that Lento Law failed to state a viable cause of action, Estrada satisfied the statutory standard for immunity under Section 8340.15 of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP law.
The more difficult question was whether applying the statute’s fee-shifting provision following a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal would conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Erie doctrine.[3] That doctrine requires a federal court sitting in diversity to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. So if a state law rule directly conflicts with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the federal rule controls; if no direct conflict exists, the court considers whether applying the state rule is necessary to discourage forum shopping and avoid inequitable administration of the laws.
The court concluded that applying Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP fee-shifting provision following a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal does not conflict with the federal rules and is therefore permissible in federal court.
Judge Perez distinguished the act’s special motion procedure from the immunity and fee-shifting provisions actually at issue. While a state-created procedural mechanism that imposed a different or heightened pretrial burden could potentially conflict with Rules 12 and 56, the court reasoned that Sections 8340.15 and 8340.18 do no such thing when applied after an ordinary federal dismissal.
They do not change what a plaintiff must plead to survive Rule 12(b)(6). They do not require the plaintiff to produce evidence at the pleading stage. And they do not impose an additional procedural hurdle before a plaintiff may proceed to discovery or trial.
Instead, the court reasoned, the anti-SLAPP law answers a different question: What follows when a defendant prevails under the otherwise applicable procedural rules against a claim arising from protected public expression? Viewed that way, the statute “creates a substantive right” — i.e., immunity from civil liability for qualifying speech-based claims — and a remedy for infringement of that right in the form of attorney fees and litigation expenses.
Accordingly, the Lento decision held that a defendant in federal court who prevails on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against a cause of action based on protected public expression is entitled to attorney fees, court costs and litigation expenses under Section 8340.18.
For plaintiffs contemplating speech-based litigation, that holding substantially changes the downside analysis. Losing a motion to dismiss may no longer mean simply the loss of the plaintiff’s own legal fees; it may also generate a mandatory obligation to pay the defendant’s costs of securing dismissal.
An Emerging Split in Pennsylvania’s Federal Courts
Lento is particularly noteworthy because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not yet addressed the application of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP law in federal court, and district courts have not spoken with one voice.
Earlier decisions, including the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s Jakes v. Youngblood decision[4] and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Salaam v. Trump decision[5] — both decided last year — concluded that the act’s special pretrial mechanisms conflicted with the federal rules.
But Judge Perez disagreed with that reasoning as applied to the circumstances presented in Lento. Until the Third Circuit resolves this district court disagreement, the application of Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute in federal court will remain a developing issue.
That uncertainty has practical consequences for attorneys on both sides of speech-based litigation.
For plaintiffs, the Lento decision counsels against treating the availability of a federal forum as a way to avoid anti-SLAPP exposure. Even where a plaintiff proceeds under the ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) framework, a court following Lento may still impose the statute’s mandatory fee-shifting remedy if the challenged claim arises from protected public expression and fails at the pleading stage.
Lawyers evaluating defamation, commercial disparagement or similar claims should therefore assess anti-SLAPP exposure before filing — not only after a defendant raises it — and should scrutinize whether the challenged statements are actionable facts, whether the pleading can survive Rule 12 and whether the potential recovery justifies the risk of paying the defendant’s fees.
For defendants, Lento supplies a road map for pairing an ordinary Rule 12(b)(6) motion with a request for immunity and fees under Sections 8340.15 and 8340.18, without relying on the act’s currently unavailable special motion procedure.
At the same time, because Lento is a district court decision and other federal judges have reached different conclusions about the statute’s federal application, outcomes may vary by judge and jurisdiction until the Third Circuit provides controlling guidance.
Counsel should therefore preserve the issue carefully, brief the distinction between the act’s procedural mechanisms and its substantive fee-shifting provisions, and monitor further appellate and district court developments.
Nevertheless, the lesson from Lento is clear: A negative online review may be damaging, but an unsuccessful lawsuit over that review may prove considerably more costly.
[1] Lento Law Group PC v. Estrada , No. 25-2763, 2026 WL 2100471 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2026).
[2] 42 Pa. C.S. § 8340.18.
[3] Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins , 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
[4] Jakes v. Youngblood , 782 F. Supp. 3d 210 (W.D. Pa. 2025).
[5] Salaam v. Trump , 350 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. Pa. 2025).
Gaetan J. Alfano and Jesse Marra, Pa. Anti-SLAPP Ruling Shows Risks Of Atty Defamation Suits, Law360 (September 1, 2026), https://www.law360.com/articles/2517139/pa-anti-slapp-ruling-shows-risks-of-atty-defamation-suits