May 21, 2026

By: Jesse Marra

On May 18, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to decide whether Title IX gives employees of federally funded educational institutions a private right to sue for sex discrimination in employment. The case, Crowther v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, No. 25-183, will resolve a long-running circuit split with direct consequences for colleges, universities, athletic departments, teaching hospitals, and other federally funded education programs.

The question is narrow but important: whether Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 permits employees—not just students—to bring private lawsuits alleging sex discrimination in employment. The Supreme Court’s grant does not decide that question; it means only that the Court will now decide whether coaches, professors, and other education employees may use Title IX as a litigation tool alongside, or instead of, Title VII.

Why the Case Matters

For most employment discrimination claims, Title VII supplies the familiar path: an employee files an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge, the agency investigates, and the employee may sue only after receiving a right-to-sue notice. Title VII also has relatively short filing deadlines and statutory damages caps.

Title IX works differently. It contains no express private remedy, but the Supreme Court has long recognized an implied private right of action in certain Title IX cases. If education employees may sue directly under Title IX for employment discrimination, they may be able to bypass key Title VII procedures, including the EEOC charge process and conciliation. That is why the issue matters so much to education employers: the answer affects not just liability theories, but litigation timing, available remedies, and institutional risk.

The Case Before the Court

The case arises from two Georgia university employees. MaChelle Joseph, the former head women’s basketball coach at Georgia Tech, alleged that she received inferior resources compared to male coaches of the men’s basketball team and that her employment was terminated because of sex discrimination. Thomas Crowther, an art professor at Augusta University, asserted Title IX sex-discrimination claims after his contract was not renewed.

The Eleventh Circuit held that Title IX does not provide employees of educational institutions a private right of action for sex discrimination in employment. In doing so, it acknowledged that other circuits had reached the opposite result, but concluded that those courts had improperly expanded Title IX’s implied cause of action.

The Circuit Split

Lower courts throughout the country are divided. Some circuits have rejected, or treated Title VII as precluding, private Title IX employment-discrimination claims. But other circuits have allowed such claims in at least some form.

That split has special importance for institutions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. The Third Circuit currently permits certain employment-related Title IX claims. In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017), the court held that Title VII’s concurrent applicability does not bar private Title IX claims for retaliation and quid pro quo harassment in a federally funded education program. So, unless the Supreme Court says otherwise, institutions in the Third Circuit must continue to treat Title IX as a potential avenue for employee claims.

What the Supreme Court Could Do

If the Supreme Court affirms the Eleventh Circuit, employment discrimination claims by college coaches, professors, and other education employees may be channeled primarily through Title VII. That outcome would narrow the use of Title IX in employment litigation and preserve Title VII’s administrative process as the main route for workplace sex-discrimination claims.

If the Court reverses the Eleventh Circuit, employees of federally funded educational institutions could bring Title IX employment-discrimination claims nationwide. That would expand potential exposure for universities and other education programs, particularly in jurisdictions that currently reject or limit such claims.

Either way, the Court’s decision will not eliminate universities’ obligations to prevent and address sex discrimination. Title VII, Title IX, state anti-discrimination laws, institutional policies, and contractual obligations will continue to apply. The practical question is which legal path employees may use when they sue.

What Institutions Should Do Now

The Court’s grant of certiorari does not require immediate policy changes. But universities and other education employers should use this period to review how employee sex-discrimination complaints are received, routed, investigated, and documented. In particular, institutions should ensure coordination between HR, Title IX offices, athletics, faculty affairs, and general counsel.

The key risk point is overlap: a complaint by a coach, professor, resident, researcher, or administrator may look like an employment issue, a Title IX issue, or both. Until the Supreme Court resolves the question, institutions should assume that plaintiffs may try to frame employment disputes under both Title VII and Title IX.

The Supreme Court’s decision will likely bring needed clarity to a question that has divided the courts for decades. For education employers, the ruling could reshape how employee sex-discrimination claims are pleaded, defended, and resolved.